Introduction
The Abenaki supposedly disappeared from Vermont a long time ago. 2 Yet reports of their departure were greatly exaggerated. Historical and anthropological studies have shown that the Abenaki never left Vermont; instead, they
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chiefly from the forest ....
However extravagant the pretension of converting the discovery of an inhabited country into conquest may appear; if the principle has been asserted in the first instance and afterward sustained; if a country has been acquired and held under it; if the great mass of the community originates in it, it becomes the law of the land and cannot be questioned. So too with respect to the principle that the Indian inhabitants are to be considered merely as occupants to be protected while in peace in the possession of their lands but to be deemed incapable of transferring the absolute title to others.' 2 This theory did not spring full-blown from the mind of Chief Justice Marshall. ' 3 Instead of being unique to the United States, the theory has deep roots in colonial outlooks of each European power that set foot in the New World. 4 Aboriginal title is the Indians' nontreaty right to possess, use, and occupy lands they have continuously occupied since time immemorial." In order to successfully invoke the protection of aboriginal title, Indians must prove actual, exclusive, and continuous use over an extended period of time. 6 When land is held under aboriginal title "no one (1968) (stating that Marshall's principles "accorded perfectly with the peculiar blend of subdued 'realism' and conspicuous humanity guiding Locke's discussion of conquest in Chapter XVI of the SECOND TREATISE').
Marshall noted that his theory was not novel when he wrote, "This opinion conforms precisely to the principle which has been supposed to be recognised by all European governments, from the first settlement of America. (1988) .
An interesting collateral issue is whether the existence of aboriginal hunting and fishing rights depends upon aboriginal title to land. See COHEN'S HANDBOOK, supra note 14, at 442; Ordon, supra, at 70-71, 76-77. Ordon has found that the existence of aboriginal rights separate from 450 [Vol. 18
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otherwise terminate aboriginal title without the consent of the sovereign" or until the sovereign has "extinguished" the aboriginal title.' 7 Extinguishment is the .'exclusive right of the United States' ... whether it be done by treaty, by the sword, by purchase, by the exercise of complete dominion adverse to the right of occupancy, or otherwise . . .
B. Abenaki Claim of Aboriginal Title
Abenaki aboriginal claims are based upon archeological and historical findings, as well as oral tradition, that show their continuous presence in the Missisquoi River region of northwestern Vermont, the Swanton-Highgate area, since 9300 B.C. 9 The Franklin District Court found that the Abenaki, "as a result of their long use and occupancy of the Missi[s]quoi territory to the exclusion of other tribes, held aboriginal title and aboriginal fishing rights in the Missisquoi territory."" Judge Wolchik found this title to be unextinguished.
2 ' However, in State v. Elliot," the Vermont Supreme Court held otherwise, finding Abenaki aboriginal title extinguished by the "increasing weight of history." ' 
II. Extinguishment

A. United States Supreme Court Test
Although extinguishment cannot exist in isolation from other questions of aboriginal title, it is a crucial issue because once extinguished, aboriginal title aboriginal title to land is a "question that awaits judicial resolution." Id. at 59; see also This "Marshall Trilogy" established a basic rule that Indians "have an unquestionable, and, heretofore, unquestioned right to the lands they occupy, until that right shall be extinguished" by the sovereign." Under this framework, the sovereign holds a fee simple title created by the right of "discovery." ' However, the title is merely a "naked fee title" 2 which gives the holder "no present possessory interest in the land." 3 This interest only allows
for an "ultimate reversion in fee,"'" because it is subject to an Indian "perpetual right of occupancy. ' The Supreme Court, in a decision by Justice Douglas, found that an executive order in 1883 establishing a reservation had extinguished aboriginal title to lands off the reservation. Id. at 358. The tribe had requested a reservation to protect lands that were "fast being populated" by whites. Id. The Court also stated:
The reservation solution had long seemed desirable in view of recurring tension between the settlers and the Walapais. 
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tions: (1) the supreme power of Congress, as sovereign, to extinguish aboriginal title; (2) the validity of various means to extinguish Indian title: treaties, force, purchase, the "exercise of complete dominion adverse to the right of occupancy, or otherwise"; (3) the necessity for "plain and unambiguous action to deprive the [Indians]" of aboriginal title; and (4) the judicial construction that "extinguishment cannot be lightly imputed." The continued validity of the Marshall Trilogy and the Santa Fe elaboration is evidenced by a trilogy of cases regarding the claims of the Oneida Indian Nation against the State of New York.' In Oneida County v. Oneida Indian Nation (Oneida II), 3 1 the Court reaffirmed the doctrine of discovery, holding that discovering nations held "fee title to these lands, subject to the Indians' right of occupancy and use."
3 It noted that "with the adoption of the Constitution, Indian relations became the exclusive province of federal law." 39 The Court further noted that the right of use and occupancy "need not be based on treaty, statute, or other formal Government action."
' Finally, the Court endorsed the key holding on extinguishment from Santa Fe: extinguishment must be "plain and unambiguous and will not be lightly implied." 4 '
B. Animating Policies
The role that this special canon of construction plays -extinguishment must be "plain and unambiguous" and will not be "lightly implied" -was acknowledged by the Vermont court in Elliot. 42 This canon stems from settle the Walapais' problem by placing them on a reservation, their acceptance of this reservation must be regarded in law as the equivalent of a release of any tribal rights which they may have had in lands outside the reservation. The Marshall Trilogy reflected this attitude.' Marshall based his characterization of the "peculiar" status of Indians as both "a dependent" and "a distinct people" on his understanding of British colonial policy before the Revolution. 4 The Indian Commerce Clause of the Constitution and the Trade and (quoting Oneida 11, 470 U.S. at 248; United States v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R., 314 U.S. 339, 346 (1941)). However, this acknowledgement seems perfunctory. The Vermont court found extinguishment despite the lack of any express statement of intent to extinguish Abenaki title. It also conceded that the "period preceding Vermont's statehood was a confusing era, and that valid questions remain as to the legitimacy of the opposing governing entities." Elliot, 616 A.2d at 221. 43. In upholding employment preferences for Indians in the Bureau of Indian Affairs against an equal protection challenge, the Supreme Court noted a "special relationship" between the federal government and Indian tribes. Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535, 552 (1974). The Court described the relationship: "In the exercise of the war and treaty powers, the United States overcame the Indians and took possession of their lands, sometimes by force, leaving them an uneducated, helpless and dependent people, needing protection against the selfishness of others and their own improvidence." Id.
Id
44. In Cherokee Nation, Marshall termed Indian nations "domestic dependent nations" and asserted that they "look to our government for protection; rely upon its kindness and its power; appeal to it for relief to their wants; and address the president as their great father." Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
In Wcrcester, Marshall was protective of Indian rights although less paternalistic:
[r]he settled doctrine of the law of nations is, that a weaker power does not surrender its independence -its right to self-government, by associating with a stronger, and taking its protection. A weak state, in order to provide for its safety, may place itself under the protection of one more powerful, without stripping itself of the right of government, and ceasing to be a state. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 560-61 (1832).
Worcester recognized the sovereign powers that Indian nations still possessed in holding that the laws of Georgia violated treaties with the Cherokee Nation. The treaties "mark out the boundary that separates the Cherokee country from Georgia; guaranty to [the Cherokee] all the land within their boundary; solemnly pledge the faith of the United States to restrain their citizens from trespassing on it; and recognize the pre-existing power of the [Cherokee] nation to govern itself." Id. at 561-62. Interestingly, the law that Marshall nullified was used to indict a Vermonter, Samuel A. Worcester. Worcester was a missionary who was translating the Bible into the Cherokee language and was residing within the limits of the Cherokee Nation, "with the permission and approval" of the Cherokee but without a state license. 
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Intercourse Acts also reflected the underlying premise that the federal government was a guardian for its Indian "wards." ' Treaties with Indian tribes and Nations in the formative days of our republic also shed light on a policy to protect Indian, land rights, although the purpose was to maintain peace. 7 For example, the 1795 Treaty of Greenville with twelve Indian nations for lands west of the Pennsylvania frontier stated: feels does not speak well of the Nation's jurisprudence in this area. Id. at 367. The thrust of Clinton's argument is that the Proclamation "embodied an enlightened colonial policy that sought to facilitate both Native American trade and colonial expansion while recognizing Indian rights in the land." Id. at 329. The failure of United States policy towards its native peoples, Clinton asserts, is due in part to "the failure of federal and state governments to learn from the teachings of this past." Id. at 330. In essence, therefore, the United States has followed formalistic protection over Native American affairs while ignoring the central tenet that supposedly underlies it, justice.
46 
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The Indian tribes who have a'right to those lands, are quietly to enjoy them, hunting, planting, and dwelling thereon so long as they please, without any molestation from the United States; but when those tribes, or any of them, shall be disposed to sell their lands, or any part of them, they are to be sold only to the United States; and until such sale, the United States will protect all the said Indian tribes in the quiet enjoyment of their lands against all citizens of the United States, and against all other white persons who intrude upon the same. 48 Thus, the requirement for plain and unambiguous acts of extinguishment stems from this underlying assumption of guardianship. 49 The deconstruction of a sovereign's actions towards Indians is essential because implicit extinguishment must be judged in light of an "avowed solicitude of the Federal government for the welfare of its Indian wards." ' Furthermore, "doubtful expressions, instead of being resolved in favor of the United States, are to be resolved in favor of a weak and defenseless people [Indians] , who are wards of the nation and dependent wholly upon its protection and good faith."'" It is upon this standard that Elliot must stand or fall.
C. Application of Rules of Extinguishment
Aboriginal title does not need to be codified in order to be valid. 56. There is an inherent tension involved in remaining true to the policies inspiring the "solicitude" towards Indian nations while responding to the "normal" everyday legal concerns of the United States and its political subdivisions. Divining congressional motives based on ambiguous acts, without Congress's having made an explicit consideration of the effect these acts will have on aboriginal rights, is difficult enough without also having to look through the lens of historical hindsight and current political expediency, as is the case in virtually all questions of extinguishment. And in the case of the eastern tribes of Indians, where the issue is further complicated by actions of the English sovereign before the Revolution and the States during the pre-Constitution period, the task of deciding if extinguishment has occurred is especially difficult. The Abenaki claims exist in the most problematic of all of these worlds since Vermont declared itself an independent republic between 1777 and its 1791 admission as the 14th State. It was created within the context of ajurisdictional dispute between New York and New Hampshire over land grants and political-judicial control.
57 Inclusion of Indian lands in forest reserves, conservation, or recreation districts have been insufficient by themselves but considered a significant factor when looking at other acts of the sovereign.' Payments of Indian land claims have increasingly been found to have extinguished aboriginal title to those lands.' Finally, if complete dominion by the sovereign is exercised over aboriginal lands in any manner or means, courts have found that Indian title over this land is extinguished.'
III. Weight Of History Decision
A. Test Derived from Elliot
The Vermont Supreme Court ostensibly paid homage to these clearly established rules for extinguishing Abenaki aboriginal title. Yet Elliot misinterprets Abenaki/Vermont history during the period from 1763 to 1791. An honest account of history would not have found extinguishment under the traditional rules. Hence, to avoid this conclusion, the Vermont Court created a radical new test that undermines the United States Supreme Court's rules and purposes protecting aboriginal title.
The court created the "weight of history" test: "Extinguishment may be established by the increasing weight of history."
67 The "weight of history" in turn means the "cumulative effect of many historical events." ' 
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that the consequences of an act would eliminate aboriginal title. Therefore, if the sovereign unleashed forces which eventually frustrated Indian occupancy, Elliot would find extinguishment in that act. Elliot implicitly holds that the cumulative effects need not be manifested at the time of or near in time to the sovereign action. The functional result of Elliot is that courts will weigh the cumulative effects of a sovereign's action over a long time -say, 200 years. This removes the barrier prohibiting the light imputing of extinguishment. Elliot undermines the entire framework of aboriginal title law.
B. Elliot's Weak Legal Foundation
The Vermont Court's point of departure was the fact that federal courts have found extinguishment on the basis of a combination of individually insufficient acts of the sovereign. "The legal standard does not require that extinguishment spring full blown from a single telling event. 73. The Elliott court relied on Gemmill for three propositions: (1) that a historical event, although insufficient itself, may contribute to a finding of extinguishment; (2) that a course of conduct over a long period of time may prove extinguishment, although the actual date is difficult to decide; and (3) congressional action may resolve ambiguities inherent in noncongressional actions. Elliot, 616 A.2d at 213-14, 221 (citing Gemmill, 535 F.2d at 1148-49).
Elliot also relied on Gila River for three propositions: (1) that authorized white settlement is one factor in deciding when aboriginal title ceased; (2) that in an appropriate factual context the opening up of an area for settlement can be tantamount to ending aboriginal title over the whole region; and (3) that congressional actions which authorized and ratified previous events may suffice as evidence of extinguishment. Id. at 219, 221 (citing Gila River, 494 F.2d at 1391-93).
Finally, Elliot relied upon San Ildefonso for three propositions: (1) extinguishment is to be analyzed in light of the particular facts, circumstances and history of the case; (2) the inclusion of Native American lands in a "forest reserve and grazing district, as well as conveyances made to various grantees at different times is evidence supporting a finding of extinguishment;" and (3) that "there are no fine spun or precise formulas for determining the end of aboriginal ownership." Id. at 214, 219, 221 (citing San lldefonso, 513 F.2d at 1387, 1389-92).
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Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018 lands into a national forest reserve, and the payment of congressionally authorized compensation 4 The Abenaki situation is not analogous." In Gila River, neither creation of a reservation, formation of a land district, surveying of Indian lands, nor actual settlement by non-Indians on a small percentage of aboriginal title lands was sufficient alone or cumulatively to extinguish Indian title.' Clearly, if a cumulative effects test were adopted as the standard, the Gila River court would have had no problem establishing extinguishment based on these events. 
C. The Weights of History
The historical record supports a judgment in favor of the Abenaki. To avoid such a result, the Vermont Court misconstrued history and changed the test. This enabled the court to appear as if it was paying homage to clearly established jurisprudential rules. The Elliot court differed "with the trial court principally in its application of the test for extinguishment .
".
. ."' Elliot relied upon four factors: (1) the land grants of New Hampshire's colonial Governor Benning Wentworth during the early 1760s; ' (2) Britain's sanctioning of European dominion over the area that is now the State of Vermont during the period from 1763 to 1777; (3) the zeal with which Vermont's political leaders and armed militiamen protected their land grants from the 1760s up to admission to the Union in 1791; and (4) the decade-long negotiations between Congress and Vermont culminating in Vermont's 1791 admission into the Union.' The following sections discuss the historical and legal problems inherent in the court's reliance upon these factors and how the court's application results in the establishment of a new and unsound test. Elliot's assertions, the Wentworth Grants did not imply an intent to extinguish Abenaki aboriginal title, nor can they accurately be used as part of a series of sovereign acts which plainly and unambiguously show an intent to extinguish Abenaki title.
The court's cursory review of this historical record does a great injustice to the Abenaki. Three problems are inherent with reliance upon the grants: (1) their ultra vires nature; (2) the failure of grantees to satisfy their conditions; and (3) the lack of impact by grantees upon Abenaki lands in the Missisquoi region.
a) The Grants' Ultra Vires Nature
The court admitted that the grants were beyond the scope of Wentworth's powers: "Governor Wentworth's grants of the lands at issue may not have been authorized by the Crown ... ."' It chose, however, to rationalize this problem away and in doing so changed the test from sovereign intent to cumulative effects (regardless of whether those effects stemmed from ultra vires actions of a non-sovereign or not): "but any ultra vires exercise of power... does not detract from the vast political changes it inspired."'
The grants were ultra vires because the land was actually in New York Province. ' 
b) Failure to Fulfill the Grants Conditions
Another problem with relying on the grants is that while the Missisquoi grants were ostensibly conditioned on settlement,' in fact they were nothing more than a lucrative means of land speculation. While Elliot drew the conclusion that these conditions evidenced an intent of Europeans to hold dominion over these Indian lands, 93 "it does not appear that any of the original grantees ever settled in Swanton, or even visited the lands which were so generously conceded to them." ' In the Missisquoi region, "the Wentworth proprietors had not occupied their property, of course, and the town's first permanent white inhabitants were Dutch settlers who began to arrive around 1785 under the impression that their lands were located in Canada." ' 9 Instead of fulfilling their conditions, the original grantees sold their rights to others, who in turn did the same until Ira Allen appropriated nearly all the Swanton grant land. According to Vermont historian Kevin Graffagnino:
In actual practice, Wentworth's charters were little more than thinly-veiled exercises in wholesale land speculation. The Governor made no attempt to include prospective settlers among his proprietors, and few of the original grantees [in any of the grants in Vermont] ever visited the lands to which they held title. 
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Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018 consisted of speculators, New Hampshire politicians and members of the Governor's administration and family.' Therefore, by misstating the conditional nature of the grants as an intent to assert dominion, the Vermont court characterized the British's inability to actualize revocation as an intentional acquiescence. However, as was the case with the ultra vires nature of the grants themselves, silence will not demonstrate an intent to acquiesce in extinguishment sufficient to satisfy the canon against lightly imputing extinguishment." If anything, the fact that the grant conditions were not fulfilled supports a finding that the Crown saw no need to intervene in the Missisquoi because no encroachment actually occurred. The Crown did have other concerns, after all, like the impending American Revolution. As such, the holding in Elliot takes a radical step away from the "strong policy of the United States' from the beginning to respect the Indian right of occupancy . . .'"
c) Actual Settlement Did Not Negate Abenaki Occupation
Elliot asserted that "[w]hile the Crown may have declared the grants invalid based on a lack of jurisdictional authority in this particular governor, the sovereign's intent to allow British appropriation of the area was not in question."'" The court erred, however, because sovereign authorities did not engage in actions which were inconsistent with Abenaki dominion.
Grantees never came to the area, and settlement was sparse until after Vermont's admission to the Union. Therefore, at best, the grants only provided grantees with "naked fee" subject to the continuing Abenaki occupation." Furthermore, this formulation of "British appropriation of the area" misstates the nature of aboriginal title: the sovereign through the "discovery" doctrine already had "appropriated" the area subject to Indian occupancy."
97. GRAFFAGNINO 
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What Elliot failed to demonstrate was any action by the British which showed an intent to take away Indian lands and give them to settlers. As noted, there was a long period between the Wentworth Grants and the establishment of any permanent European settlement in Missisquoi. The Abenaki continued t6 dominate the area. 3 The first permanent white settler, John Hilliker, leased his 100 acres in 1786 from the Abenaki, not from any grantee."
4 Swanton, according to the 1790 census (taken in 1791), had seventy-four non-Indian residents,"° while local white historians put the number of Abenaki at about seventy in 1793."l The Wentworth Grants, therefore, had "little perhaps no practical effect" on settlement and land tenure in the Missisquoi region prior to Vermont's admission into the Union in In the war of competing land grants between Wentworth and New York, colonial authorities in New York granted Simon Metcalfe a grant of 33,000 acres in the region to establish Prattsburgh in 1767. He established a sawmill at the site of the abandoned Robertson-French mill, and a home and traded with the Indians. Local historians surmised that he worked closely with Robertson and might have been in his employ. He was also a New York provincial surveyor. Metcalfe's sawmill employed about 50 workmen, so that around the mill a sizeable community existed. This community dispersed after the mill was burnt around the beginning of the Revolution. Metcalfe lived amongst the Abenakis and relied on their trade in furs. Barney & Perry, supra note 1, at 965-71; LEDoux, supra, at 14-16.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'r OF COMMERCE & LABOR, HEADS OF FAMILIES AT THE FIRST CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES TAKEN IN THE YEAR 1790, VERMONT at 27 (1907).
106. Barney & Perry, supra note 1, at 1001. Town settlement was concentrated in five basic areas, leaving much of the town unsettled by whites. Id. at 996-97. The town's first "Town Meeting" occurred in 1790 in the home of a man living in the Abenaki lease section of Swanton and Highgate. Id. In fact, most of the early settlers were Dutch and most had been loyalists during the Revolution who went north thinking they were in Canada. Id. at 993-1001. Whatever settlement that occurred in the Missisquoi region "largely ignored the political" boundaries. The region, lake-bay-river, was treated as a unit by its inhabitants. Brian Young, Conflict and Consensus: Lake Champlain from the Canadian Perspective, in LAKE CHAMPLAIN: REFLECTIONS ON OUR PAST 143, 144 (Jennie G. Versteeg ed., 1987).
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1791."° Furthermore, significant amounts of land were ungranted. In 1796, for example, Silas Hathaway petitioned the General Assembly for land in Swanton and Highgate because after a survey by the Surveyor-General there existed a vast amount of ungranted lands."Ẽ lliot used the Wentworth Grants for two misguided purposes: to hint at a sovereign intent to divest the Abenaki of their Missisquoi homelands and, acknowledging the problems inherent in that exercise, to establish the baseline for its cumulative effects test. Unable to point to a sovereign action manifesting an intent to extinguish, Elliot substituted silence and inaction for the requisite plain and unambiguous act. It transformed a requirement to demonstrate an intent to extinguish into a requirement to demonstrate an intent to stop unauthorized actions from dispossessing Indians. The grants were ultra vires and revoked by the Crown, the grantees never fulfilled their obligations, and the Abenaki continued to hold dominion over the area up through Admission. To these facts, Elliot answers with the cry of "vast political changes [the grants] inspired." This is not a mere misapplication. Elliot turns two centuries of Indian law and its guiding principle on its head in creating its new rule. 
British Policy Towards the Abenaki and the Region
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Elliot pointed to neither Crown policies nor acts which might have allowed it to properly infer extinguishment. Instead, it ignores express Crown policy and intent to protect Indian rights, including those of the Abenaki." 0 Elliot changed the standard by which to judge acts of the sovereign by finding support for extinguishment in the failure of the English authorities to affirmatively, actively, and constantly protect Abenaki land rights.' Worst of all, Elliot ignored express actions of Crown officials that were supportive of Abenaki aboriginal rights."' Neither did the Vermont court point to specific changes that so undermined Abenaki occupancy of the Missisquoi region as to negate this essential element of aboriginal title."' The historical record supports the Abenaki, not extinguishment; the court evaded this conclusion by creating a new test in which extinguishment was lightly imputed, in contravention of fundamental Indian policy.
a) Crown Indian Policy
Crown policy towards Indians in general, including the Abenakis, was established by the 1761 Royal Instruction, the Royal Proclamation of 1763, and the terms of peace that resulted from the British victory in the French and Indian War." 4 Elliot found the 1761 Royal Instruction and, the Royal Gila River, the court pointed to the continuing interest by the Commissioner of Indian Affairs in protecting Indian lands from encroachment in relationship to the protective role that the reservation, created in 1859, played in stopping such encroachments. Gila River, 494 F.2d at 1390. The Commissioner looked with alarm at the explosion of white settlement on offreservation lands between 1870 and 1880 and recommended to Congress and the President the expansion of the reservation to preserve and protect Indian agricultural lands. Id. Therefore it "is not far afield to infer that the Government was very aware of the extent and [negative] potentiality of settlement at that period" and the court found that expansion of the reservation to 96% of its final size in 1883 was a reasonable date to set extinguishment. Id. at 1393. San Ildefonso, in noting the piecemeal fashion of white settlement, rejected the "vast political changes" approach of Elliot. It found extinguishment only when these changes were endorsed by settlement made actually pursuant to public land law conveyances, when Indian lands were included by the federal government in the Jemez Forest Reserve, or when the land was placed within federal New Mexico Grazing District No. 1. San ldefonso, 513 F.2d at 1391-92. Hence to properly analogize the Abenaki situation to these cases, the Vermont court would have had to have shown that the British confronted any changes the grants had spawned and then decided to ratify the changes in a manner adverse to Abenaki possession. 
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Proclamation of 1'763 to be "paper tigers" because the grantees were not dispossessed of the land or removed at the Crown's direction; this indicated an "increasing European dominion adverse to the use and occupation of the Indians, to which the Crown impliedly consented."" The Proclamation "embodied an enlightened colonial policy that sought to facilitate both Native American trade and colonial expansion while recognizing Indian rights in the land." Clinton, supra note 45, at 329. The policy evolved slowly, beginning in the 1720s with the growing role of the London Board of Trade in regulating Indian affairs and the subsequent diminution of the role of colonial governors. By 1739, instead of leaving all decisions regarding Indian affairs to colonial governors, "the British government had begun to coordinate and direct colonial Indian policy with increasing frequency and force." Id. at 342.
In 1754, the Albany Conference was convened to discuss Indian affairs (the seven northern colonies, including New Hampshire were all represented); initiated by the Board of Trade in order to make uniform policy towards the Indians, the conference plan recommended that only colonial governments be permitted to purchase Indian lands and such purchases would only occur at public councils with the Indians. The plan was never implemented. Id. at'345-49.
The French and Indian War of 1756 disrupted, yet accelerated, the centralizing process. In 1761 the Crown "divested local colonial authorities of control over Indian land cessions" in a Royal Instruction. Id. at 354. The Royal Proclamation of 1763 (barely two months after the Swanton-Highgate Grants) reaffirmed and implemented Crown Indian policy.
Special licenses were required for settlements on Indian lands and the Crown forbade granting title to Indian lands not "ceded to or purchased" by the Crown. Having conveyed property rights in North America to the colonists by various charters and patents, the crown was initially satisfied to let the colonists purchase and extinguish Indian title, either individually or through the colonies. Since [Vol. 18
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Indian policy until the early 1760s. "7 Therefore, the Elliot court had unrealistic and inequitable expectations about the British capacity to effectively implement a new, ambitious policy. Indeed, the problem in implementing British Indian policy is analogous to a problem facing many modem American political jurisdictions: strong laws have been written in response to serious deficiencies in the common law or existing statutes, but implementation is hampered by serious problems, including insufficient funding, poor enforcement mechanisms, and inconsistent administration based on the vagaries of politics."' Yet the inability to implement laws does not support an argument that the laws have lost their binding effect.
Thus, Elliot is wrong to equate poor implementation of the Proclamation with implicit intent to extinguish Abenaki title or seriously undermine it. The Vermont court did not analyze why the Crown failed to enforce the Proclamation more vigorously, imputing reasons not supported by the historical record. In fact, implementation of the new, centralized approach was extremely difficult and costly. For example, it took four years for the British Indian Superintendents to achieve the first implementing task: to set a more meticulous Indian boundary line as called for in the Proclamation.' Also, a western frontier war, Pontiac's Rebellion, had to be fought during the inception individual land transactions frequently created military frictions with the Indians, the British colonies soon filled the regulatory void.... Thus, by 1755 the British government had recognized that the colonies were unable to keep peace with the Indians in the absence of a comprehensive and uniform imperial Indian policy. Id. at 20, 22.
117. Clinton, supra note 45, at 354-55. Prior to centralization, conflicts arose due to the competing needs of colonialists and Native Americans while competition with France and Spain over the loyalty of Indian nations also increased. The Crown responded by centralizing its Indian policy, manifesting its goals through the use of instructions and proclamations, but not the resources necessary to effectively enforce them. Id. at 331-54; see also Clinton & Hotopp, supra note 116, at 22 ("[E]ven more stringent measures were required to stem the tide of white settlers encroaching on Indian land."). And:
Although [the Proclamation of 1763] was a new departure, there was a background from which it grew. Wise men who were acquainted with the evils existing in Indian affairs in the colonies and who realized more and more that the great cause of Indian troubles was the steady encroachment of the whites upon the land of the Indians had been advocating that a clear line of demarcation be drawn between the areas of the two races. PRUCHA, FORMATIVE YEARS, supra note 46, at 14.
118. As a City Councilor in Burlington, Vermont, from 1986 to 1992, the author can attest to the inability of government to effectively fund the enforcement of all the laws on its books; this is true for zoning, traffic control, drug enforcement, or pollution control. One example is in minimum housing code enforcement, where inspections are mandated to be conducted every three years, yet funds are insufficient to staff the necessary personnel.
119. Clinton, supra note 45, at 358.
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Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2018 of the policy. 2 ' Finally, a 1764 proclamation implementation plan was shelved in 1768, primarily due to the cost. ' In 1768, the Crown returned implementation of its new policy to colonial authorities because it was "hoping that [they] would learn from [their] previous mismanagement . . . .'"' Unfortunately, colonial authorities did not implement the policy, resulting in abuses and land encroachments which caused widespread Indian unrest up to the eve of the Revolution.'" By the mid1770s, the British were poised for a reassertion of centralized control, only to be forestalled by the American Revolution." Benning Wentworth, the New Hampshire Grants, and subsequent New York Grants in the Missisquoi region were not exceptions to this historical record." 120. IM. at 354; see PRUCHA, FORMATIVE YEARS, supra note 46, at 17. Pontiac's Rebellion gave an "emergency stamp" to English policy because of its serious blockade of Detroit, the defeat of many British rescue missions, and the "universal pannic throughout the Frontiers" that it inspired. Id. at 17.
121. The policy always faced colonial opposition. Therefore, "the very success of prior British efforts to centralize control over Indian affairs rendered less ominous the Indian and French threats" so that the "heavy estimated cost to the Crown of twenty thousand pounds a year" did not seem justified. Clinton, supra note 45, at 360-61.
122. 1& at 361. In light of the cost, it is also not unreasonable to believe that the British hoped that colonial implementation of the Proclamation would appease the colonists who bristled at the restrictions and the fact that "British officials were henceforward to dispose of large sections of the Western territory and settle the question as to who was to reap the profits of the various operations there, including the fur business." BEARD & BEARD, supra note 39, at 94.
123. British officials lamented colonial failure to implement the Proclamation. According to the Earl of Hillsborough: "I am persuaded that could it have been foreseen, that the Colonies would have been so backward and negligent in meeting those gracious intentions of the King, which induced his Majesty to leave the. .. [implementation] to them, their Representation on the subject would have not so far prevailed ....
Clinton, supra note 45, at 362. Even such a notable American such as George Washington did not take the implementation of the policy as well as the policy itself seriously. "I can never look upon that proclamation in any other light (but this I say between ourselves), than as a temporary expedient to quiet the minds of the Indians, and must fall, of course, in a few years. [Vol. 18 https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss2/4
NOTES & COMMENTS b) A Requirement for Affirmative Action?
The Elliot court found that Royal efforts to end the dispute between New York and New Hampshire "manifest an intention to pacify the two British jurisdictions, not protect Native Americans."' 2 This evidences another attempt to establish a requirement that the sovereign must exercise its guardianship powers or Native Americans will lose whatever protective shield guardianship offers. Elliot concludes that "[t]he necessary and inevitable outcome of the Crown's position would still be that Europeans would appropriate the area, especially since the settlement of the lands was a British goal during this time.'"27 Yet the same "necessary and inevitable outcome" that resulted from the general opening up of western United States lands to white settlement was found by Gila River to be insufficient to satisfy the canon against light extinguishment." This was the same outcome that inevitably resulted from vesting powers over Indian affairs in the states through the Articles of Confederation. The Constitution and the Nonintercourse Acts removed those powers and centralized them, but it did so without adequate implementation mechanisms. The argument that inaction equalled ratification and implicit consent was expressly rejected by Oneida I.,
c) British Settlement Policy in the Missisquoi
Although it was a fundamental premise in Elliot that European settlement adverse to Abenaki possession resulted from the grants, clearly the Wentworth Given the distance, the wildness of the country, and his basic desire to spawn a speculative buying spree of land title, not land use or occupancy, there is no evidence Wentworth even knew of the Abenaki occupation of the Missisquoi. Also, the grants covered only a small part of the region. There was no intention to enforce the conditions of the grant. Early settlers were not grant holders. The closest government to the area, Montreal, enforced the protective aspect of the Crown's policy in 1765 when it refused to grant title to English settlers because it would conflict with Abenaki lands. See supra notes 92-108 and accompanying text.
126. State v. Elliot, 616 A.2d 210, 230 (Vt. 1992) ("[Ihe Crown did not retract any authority to make grants in order to protect the aboriginal occupants in this area, but instead merely attempted, as the trial court stated, to end the two provinces dispute over who had jurisdiction."). [T]he Constitution and the Trade and Intercourse Acts were intended to vest control of Indian affairs in the federal government and to end the abuses caused by lack of uniform policies among the states .... The lines drawn delineating Indian Country were intended to regulate western expansion by defining the territory within which whites could not freely move. The United States fully contemplated that the Indian tribes would continue to cede lands east of the line but that these cessions would conform fully to the requirements of the statutory restraint against alienation. In this respect the Trade and Intercourse Acts were similar in approach to the Proclamation of 1763 ....
Id. (emphasis added).
See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
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Grants did not result in grantees coming into possession of Abenaki lands.
The discrepancy between the lands granted and the lands aboriginally occupied was significant. Actual settlement practice left the Abenaki in control of their historic homelands.
t ' Elliot grudgingly acknowledges the Crown's intent to protect aboriginal title when it refers to the policy as a "paper tiger." Yet the court ignored key acts of English support for the Abenaki that resulted from these obligations and policies. For example, the English acknowledged the Abenaki's Missisquoi possessions and encouraged them to lease these lands in the mid-1760s."' 1
In 1765 the Governor of Lower Canada refused to grant title of 2000 acres on the Missisquoi because it was found to be Abenaki land.' In the same year, Robertson's ninety-one-year lease of timberland from the Abenakisome 4.5 miles long by 1.5 miles wide -was registered with colonial authorities in Quebec province.' At a meeting on Isle La Motte in 1766, the Governor of Quebec responded to Abenaki complaints that their lands were being encroached upon by saying: "I will enquire into the particulars of your request, in the mean while you may rest assured of Justice and Protection
"'134
In addition to other factors, geography also played a role in the reaction of the British to the interests of the Abenaki in the Missisquoi. Authorities in Canada, French and English, historically exercised jurisdiction over the Missisquoi region. Abenaki representative attended, as did Caughnawaga Mohawks and Daniel Claus, a deputy in the Crown Indian Affairs office. Id. at 73. During the meeting, the Abenaki asserted their right to their ancestral Missisquoi lands. They complained in the particular of the New York grant to Simon Metcalfe, who was claiming a significant portion of Abenaki land in Missisquoi, including their "Village and Plantations." CALLOWAY, supra note 3, at 195. The Caughnawagas also asserted claims to these lands, and proceeded to cede these land claims to the English, retaining only hunting and fishing rights. Id. at 194-95. The Abenakis never ceded or sold any rights at this meeting. These grants violated Proclamation of 1763 policy by taking advantage of the Crown decision to vest colonial authorities with the power to implement the Proclamation. Because the policy limited acquisition of Indian lands to voluntary agreement made at an open, public meeting, attended by the Indians and colonial governor and no such meeting occurred, the grants were in contravention of British policy. When confronted with a similar request two years earlier, British officials in Quebec refused to make the grants. New York's grants were exactly the sort of action that would lead the British to seek recentralization in the 1770s. Also, the grants were still subject to a right of occupancy, which the Abenaki exercised. Id.
139. The New York grants in the Missisquoi were in violation of royal instructions issued in 1767, 1769, and 1770 which prohibited the making of any grants in the Champlain valley. 7 STATE PAPERS OF VERMONT: NEW YORK LAND PATENTS 1688-1786, at 8-9 (Mary G. Nye ed., 1947) [hereinafter 7 STATE PAPERS OF VERMONT]. The reality was that the handicaps of distance, slow communication and transportation which prevailed at that time, and often the lack of a clear understanding of the actual condition on such a vast unsettled tract of wilderness sometimes led to a miscarriage of the intentions of the home office, and human nature being what it is, the colonial representatives of the Crown occasionally took advantage of the opportunities which lay before them, and granted lands in opposition to their instructions.
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Hence, when looked at in its entirety, Royal policy towards the Abenaki was not a dead letter in the northwest corner of Vermont. The region was a wilderness, barely surveyed. Topographically, Abenaki lands spanned the political border. Abenaki occupied the Missisquoi River and Bay region and white settlement was de minimis. Settlers in the pre-Revolution period coexisted with Abenakis in a manner demonstrating that Abenaki aboriginal title could coexist with Crown policy and the settlement that it allowed. If anything, the Wentworth Grants' title and dominion in this period, for this region, were "paper tigers."
Sovereign Acts of the Republic of Vermont
The 'Vermont Supreme Court could not have found the Abenaki aboriginal title to the Missisquoi extinguished by actions of the government of Vermont prior to admission to the Union in 1791.4' Primarily this is because Vermonters never even confronted the issue of aboriginal title until 1798, some seven years after admission to the Union. 4 ' Furthermore, it is doubtful that Vermont was legally entitled to any of the sovereign powers required to extinguish aboriginal title. Finally, the vigorous assertion of Vermont sovereignty by the Green Mountain Boys, so relied upon by Elliot, had no impact upon the Abenaki during the "republic" period between 1777 and 1791. Therefore, only a radical alteration of the traditional test for extinguishment would have allowed Vermont to contribute to the termination of the Abenaki's title.
a) Legislative Action
That Vermont as a republic never extinguished Abenaki title is best evidenced by a comprehensive report made to the Vermont House of Representatives in 1854. 42 The report notes that on September 29, 1798, representatives of the Iroquois Confederacy petitioned the Vermont legislature for settlement of a land claim stretching from Ticonderoga to the Canadian 
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border, spanning from Lake Champlain to the spine of the Green Mountains.' 43 The legislature appointed an investigating legislative committee; the committee refused to recommend a settlement, properly assessing the 1790 Nonintercourse Act as prohibiting state action." Most importantly, it reported that "the committee... cannot ascertain whether that title has been extinguished by purchase, conquest, dereliction of occupancy, or in any other way whatever."' 45 Therefore, the report unambiguously infers that Vermont never took an action to extinguish aboriginal title. After receiving the report, the legislature, with the governor and council concurring,'" passed an act 47 which validated this finding" and authorized a gubernatorial investigation of the issue plus "a present of affection, not exceeding the value of one hundred dollars" to the Indian representatives. 4 9 Further evidence that the "Republic of Vermont" never extinguished aboriginal title is found in the report the following year by Governor Isaac Tichenor 59 Given that Tichenor was part of an "oligarchy of a small but powerful group of men who dominated Vermont politics for over two decades,'' if the Vermont legislature had acted to extinguish aboriginal title, clearly Tichenor would have participated in and alluded to those actions. He did not. 148. The Assembly focused on that part of the report that alluded to the necessity of the Indians producing the "necessary documents" and "clear and circumstantial proofs" that the claim rested upon a proper legal foundation. Id. at 614.
149. "And whereas, this Assembly feel a strong desire to maintain perfect peace and good understanding with the nations above mentioned, although this claim stands entirely unsupported by any legal or equitable proof hitherto exhibited to this Assembly .... " Id. at 616.
150. Id at 619-23. Tichenor's report is based upon inquiries-"made relative to the claims of the seven nations of Indians of Lower Canada, in pursuance of the act of legislature on this subject, passed at their session in October last." Id. at 619.
151. Aichele, supra note 146, at 31. His one year term as governor in 1789-90 was the only interruption in the reign of Governor Thomas Chittenden (1777-97). Id. Tichenor was a member of the Vermont delegation which negotiated a settlement over the land grants dispute with New York in 1790. 7 STATE PAPERS OF VERMONT, supra note 139, at 14.
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Published The Vermont court asserted that the military actions of the Green Mountain Boys evidenced an intent to assert domination over all of the Wentworth Grants' lands.'" Despite the lack of extensive civil authority," 4 164. Even those Wentworth Grants for southern Vermont that were settled had little in the way of colonial authority exerted over them.
The basic authority in the early settlements had been that inherent in the town charter.... Nor was any significant governing authority exercised over the Grants by the chartering authority, New Hampshire. This was due in part to the dispute of jurisdiction, lack of need for authority, and the decline of the New England proprietorship system generally. 12 STATE PAPERS OF VERMONT: LAwS OF VERMONT, supra note 86, at x.
165. Aichele, supra note 146, at 6. The Green Mountain Boys were organized as "military https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol18/iss2/4
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capped by the arrest of New York's judicial officers at Westminster on March 14-16, 1775, destroyed the last real vestiges of New York power over Vermont and set in motion the creation of Vermont.
1 6 This is in sharp contrast to the absolute lack of presence by grantees and their government in the Abenaki's aboriginal lands. Neither the creation of nor the governance of Vermont was accomplished through the actions of white settlers living in the northwestern corner of the state. They were simply not a part of this action. The region would not fall under effective control of Vermont until after Vermont's 1791 admission to the Union."
6 Therefore, without the evidence that it tried to extinguish Abenaki aboriginal title and with the questionable sovereign power to do so, Vermont cannot be said to have extinguished Abenaki aboriginal title during the "republic" period.
Vermont's Admission into the Union as the Fourteenth State
Elliot does not allude to evidence which shows that the negotiations for Vermont's admission into the Union considered the Abenaki occupation of the Missisquoi. Nor did the court refer to evidence indicating that the impact of white settlement -past, present, or future -on the Abenaki was considered in these negotiations. If it had, the court might have been correct in holding that admission effectively "ratified" extinguishment."
These facts do not exist. Elliot departs from precedent in finding extinguishment without identifying the congressional consideration which clearly and unambiguously imply a ratification of extinguishment. The complete absence of federal consideration stands in sharp comparison to Oneida, which refused to impute ratification based upon a much stronger showing of federal consideration. 69 companies" that were "sympathetic to the claims" of neighboring farms.
1 COUNCIL & GOVERNOR
, supra note 86, at 4-11; see DOYLE, supra note 86, at 12-15.
Within the year after the Westminster Massacre, the coalescing of grantees into a coherent political body began.
167. The first Vermont surveyors did not appear in Swanton until 1787. No roads existed. The fist settlers in the Wentworth Grant section, west Swanton, were of Dutch decent, British loyalists who settled in both Swanton and Highgate mistakenly thinking that they were in Canada, north of the 45th degree of latitude. The first town meeting was not held until March 23, 1790, and only five of the more than twenty offices available were filled. No permanent white settlements in east Swanton occurred prior to 1790. Barney & Perry, supra note 1, at 993-1002. 168. Elliot, 616 A.2d at 221. Elliot posited that it merely differed with St. Francis over its application of the extinguishment test, and indeed it does try to focus upon a "sovereign consent to extinguish aboriginal rights." Id. at 214. It held that "Vermont's admission to the Union...
[gave] final, official sanction to the previous events .... " Id. at 221. It pointed to the preadmission negotiations in general and the 1781 congressional inquiry into fulfillment of the grants' conditions as evidence that Congress knew it was granting Vermont full, unencumbered title to the Wentworth Grants. Id. at 217 n.8. "There is no doubt that Congress considered and intended the New Hampshire Grants, in 1791, to be possessory. at x (2d ed. 1974) . The Continental Congress refused to get involved, instead passing a resolution preventing the creation of any new state out an existing one without the consent of the Continental Congress and the legislature of the existing state. Aichele, supra note 146, at 24. By 1782, General Washington appealed to Vermont's Governor Chittenden to withdraw its claims to New Hampshire, assuring the governor that once the claims were removed the obstacles to admission to the Union would also be nmoved. Id. at 29; DOYLE, supra note 86, at 47. Vermont immediately renounced these claims ar.d reapplied for admission to the Union but was rejected for political reasons: Vermont's expected opposition to western land claims of certain states, congressional desire to limit Vermont's participation in the ongoing peace negotiations with Britain, and fear that the Vermont example would spark the dismemberment of other states. Id. at 47-49.
Howaver, in 1790, even after the resolution of the New York jurisdictional dispute, Vermont's admission to the Union hinged upon the power struggle between slave and non-slave states, big states anI small states, and in general the territorial integrity of existing states. See 7 STATE PAPERS OF VERMONT, supra note 139, at 13-14; DOYLE, supra note 86, at 59; Peter S. Onuf, 
